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FLEXIBILITY IN TRADE BLOC DESIGN* 
MARK MELATOS AND STEPHANIE DUNN 
 
ABSTRACT 
A key characteristic of any trade bloc is its “flexibility” – the extent to which it can be 
modified or augmented by existing members.  This paper investigates how 
prospective trade bloc members value the flexibility of proposed trade agreements in 
a changing trading environment.  We demonstrate that country characteristics as well 
as the nature of the trade shock influence a nation’s desire for trade bloc flexibility.  
Our model of endogenous coalition formation yields predictions that are consistent 
with three stylized facts which characterize regionalism: (i) overlapping trade 
agreements, (ii) the popularity of free trade areas relative to customs unions and (iii) 
renegotiation or disbandment of existing trade agreements is rare.  Finally, for the first 
time in the literature, we provide clear predictions about the identity of “hub” and 
“spoke” trade bloc members when overlapping free trade areas arise in equilibrium. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) have proliferated at an unprecedented rate in 
recent years.  A number of stylised facts characterise this trend.  First, overlapping 
RTAs, in which countries simultaneously belong to multiple agreements, are now 
common.1  Second, in practice, RTAs are rarely disbanded or undergo significant 
renegotiation.2  This is despite the fact that they operate in a dynamic trading 
environment and, hence, are unlikely to remain optimal without modification.  
Finally, the vast majority of RTAs take the form of free trade areas (FTAs); few 
customs unions (CUs) are observed.3  This is inconsistent with theoretical arguments 
that, from the point of view of member countries, CUs welfare-dominate FTAs.   
This paper investigates how, faced with a changing trading environment, 
countries make decisions about trade bloc formation and design.  How does the nature 
of trade integration today reflect beliefs about the future trading environment?  In 
light of the stylised facts described above, two questions are of particular interest.  
First, in a trading world subject to shocks, how do countries decide whether to stand 
alone, support global free trade or form an FTA or a CU?  Second, how does the 
potential for trade blocs to overlap influence this decision?  Underlying these 
questions is the issue of trade bloc flexibility – the ease with which members can 
modify or augment an existing agreement.  This paper represents a first attempt at 
understanding how nations value the degree of flexibility inherent in a trade bloc 
when such coalitions are (to some extent at least) irreversible.  This is a crucial issue 
because, in a trading world subject to change, a country’s attitude to trade bloc 
flexibility is likely to help determine the type of coalition they wish to join. 
This paper is based on the following conjecture: that the growth in 
overlapping trade blocs reflects the prohibitively high (reputation) cost of ‘undoing’ 
(i.e., reneging on) a trade agreement.  Consequently, and consistent with the stylised 
facts described, countries adapt to changes in the trading environment by forming new 
trade blocs in addition to their existing agreements – overlapping RTAs result.  
Overlapping RTAs, however, can be more readily established the more flexible the 
design of any existing trade blocs. 
There has been relatively little analysis of how countries choose between 
different types of trade agreements in a static world, let alone over time.  Riezman 
(1985) pioneered the use of coalition formation techniques to analyse trade agreement 
formation.  Recently, Abrego et al. (2006) and Melatos and Woodland (2007) among 
others have systematically analysed coalition formation between symmetric and 
asymmetric countries.  All these analyses, however, are static; the decision to form a 
particular trade bloc is assumed to be a one-off event.  As a result, changes to the 
trading environment and, hence, the inter-temporal suitability of trade bloc design are 
                                                   
1 Almost 75% of countries belong to two or more trade blocs simultaneously (authors’ calculations 
based on data obtained from the WTO’s Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS) 
available at http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx).  
2 Most trade agreements include a clause stipulating withdrawal procedures; members are typically 
required to give advance notice of 6-12 months.  Nevertheless, changes to RTA membership are rare.  
Of 272 RTAs currently in force, 260 are “new” while only 12 relate to the accession of new members; 
most of the latter relate to European Union accession (WTO RTA-IS database).  Cases of countries 
withdrawing from trade blocs tend to be exceptional: Venezuela withdrew from the Andean Pact in 
2006; Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria left the Central European Free 
Trade Area (CEFTA) to join the European Union.   
3 Of 272 RTAs currently in force, 161 are FTAs and only 21 are CUs (WTO RTA-IS database). 
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not considered.  Moreover, issues of trade agreement flexibility and overlap do not 
arise.  In this paper, we explicitly model trade bloc formation over time. 
While the ‘spaghetti bowl’ of overlapping trade agreements is widely 
acknowledged, there is little formal analysis of the phenomenon.  Existing work, 
though illuminating, is largely descriptive and does not explain the formation of such 
agreements.  Wonnacott (1996) and Krueger (1997) discuss the potential welfare 
implications of “hub-and-spoke” systems of RTAs.  They argue that overlapping trade 
agreements dilute, for member countries, the value of concessions associated with an 
RTA.  Overlap reduces welfare by increasing the administration and enforcement 
costs incurred to prove origin.  Moreover, industry has greater opportunity to lobby 
for protection.  The problems with trade bloc overlap, however, fail to explain its 
pervasiveness.  This paper demonstrates that countries pursue overlapping trade blocs 
if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.   
Existing work on trade bloc flexibility mainly focuses on the role of 
‘contingency measures’ such as safeguards and antidumping procedures.4  Such 
measures can forestall more extreme protectionist tendencies (Bagwell and Staiger, 
1990), help governments garner current domestic support for trade liberalization when 
future support is not guaranteed (Bagwell and Staiger, 2005), “shelter” firms in 
member countries from world price fluctuations (Freund and Ozden, 2008) and 
solidify cooperation between members who wish to avoid being targeted by such 
measures (Martin and Vergote, 2008).  While the inclusion of contingency measures 
tends to reduce the (terms-of-trade) benefits arising from cooperation, they allow 
countries to respond to changes in the trading environment, credibly commit to time-
consistent trade liberalization and address the contractual incompleteness of trade 
agreements (Guriev and Klimenko, 2009; Horn et al., 2010). 
Since contingency measures appear in all types of trade agreements, this form 
of flexibility is unlikely to explain the stylised facts we identified at the outset.  The 
literature on contingency measures does not (seek to) explain the popularity of FTAs 
relative to CUs nor the phenomenon of overlapping FTAs.  Since these are our chief 
concerns, we focus on an alternative form of trade bloc flexibility.   
Contingency measures enhance trade bloc flexibility by facilitating a 
temporary, WTO-compliant departure from existing policy commitments in response 
to a temporary change in the trading environment.  In contrast, the stylised facts listed 
above reflect countries’ (irreversible) trade bloc membership decisions that are more 
likely to relate to permanent changes in the trading environment.  As such, we define 
trade bloc flexibility as the ease with which countries can modify or augment an 
existing trade agreement; that is, the ability of a bloc member to permanently alter 
their coalition membership status in response to a shock to the trading environment.  
In light of this definition, trade bloc flexibility is an issue if: (i) the trading 
world is subject to shocks which alter a country’s preferences over types of trade 
agreements and (ii) trade blocs are, to some extent, irreversible – due, for example, to 
non-trivial reputation costs.5  These two crucial assumptions underpin our analysis. 
                                                   
4 See WTO (2009) for a comprehensive and highly accessible survey of this literature. 
5 Schwartz and Sykes (2002) argue that the costs of reneging on trade agreements are twofold; the 
reneging country suffers reputation and credibility costs when dealing with the injured country in the 
future and also incurs costs when dealing with all other nations aware of the breach.  Maggi (1999) 
suggests that the dissemination of information is a primary role of the WTO, informing third parties of 
trade agreement breaches and thus strengthening the enforcement mechanism of reputation costs. 
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The role of irreversibility in trade bloc formation has received little formal 
attention in the regionalism literature.  In a trading world subject to change, this is an 
important oversight because irreversibility implies that bloc formation is time 
dependent.  The decision to establish a trade agreement, its design, and the identity of 
members all depend on coalition formation decisions taken by trading nations in the 
past.  In other words, trade bloc formation and design depends, not just on the current 
trading environment, but also (implicitly) on the past trading environment.  
Irreversibility also implies that prospective members face a trade-off between 
rigid and flexible trade agreement design.  Rigid trade blocs not only have the 
potential to yield immediate terms-of-trade benefits for their members, they also serve 
to bind members to a free trade future with each other.  Moreover, the ability of non-
members to form (overlapping) trade agreements with member countries in the future 
is reduced the more rigid the design of the bloc.  In other words, rigid trade blocs have 
an insurance value to prospective members.6  On the other hand, members of flexible 
blocs can respond more readily to changes in the trading environment – flexible trade 
agreements also have an option value to prospective members.   
In a trading environment subject to change, therefore, irreversibility provides 
an incentive for countries to be forward-looking when committing to a trade bloc. A 
country’s coalition formation decision reflects its desired degree of flexibility.  In 
particular, a country’s preferred mode of integration reflects a desire to insure itself 
against trade environment shocks while maintaining an option to respond to changes.  
In this paper we explicitly model these costs and benefits of trade bloc flexibility. 
In a world of trade bloc irreversibility the degree of agreement flexibility 
varies by coalition type.  At one extreme, standing alone affords a country maximum 
flexibility to respond to changes in the trading environment.  At the other extreme, 
global free trade implies minimum coalitional flexibility.  Regional agreements such 
as FTAs and CUs provide members with intermediate levels of flexibility.  A CU, 
however, is more rigid than a FTA.  Union members levy a ‘common external tariff’ 
(CET) on non-members and the CET revenue is shared according to an agreed 
formula.  Partners in an FTA, on the other hand, choose their own external tariff rates, 
but must agree on a schedule of “rules-of-origin” (RoO) that determine the duty-free 
status of goods originating in non-member nations but traded within the FTA.  While 
RoO are costly, they prevent non-members arbitraging away any external tariff 
differences between FTA members.  In this respect, RoO enhance FTA flexibility.   
While reneging on an existing trade agreement is costly, so too is establishing 
an overlapping agreement, especially when a rigid RTA is involved.  The costs of 
overlap relate to any compensation a country must pay members of their existing 
agreement before establishing a new, concurrent RTA.  Since a CU requires members 
to coordinate their choice of external tariffs, costs of overlap tend to be greater when a 
CU is involved.7  For example, the establishment of an FTA involving an existing CU 
member requires the cooperation of both members of the original CU.  The 
establishment of a CU which shares a member with an existing FTA requires all the 
CU members to levy a zero tariff on all members of the original FTA.  For simplicity, 
in this paper we abstract from compensation issues by assuming that countries can 
                                                   
6 Ethier (2002) refers to the insurance motive for contingency measures (i.e. unilateralism) within a 
multilateral framework.  Observed behavior confirms that nations consider the impact of (expected) 
future shocks when deciding whether or not to join a trade agreement.  Perroni and Whalley (2000) 
argue that small countries may seek to join RTAs as insurance against future protection. 
7 Crawford and Fiorentino (2005) demonstrate that FTAs are concluded more rapidly than CUs. 
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only form overlapping FTAs.  While this is a restrictive assumption, our primary aim 
is simply to demonstrate that, in a changing trading world, trade bloc irreversibility 
leads countries to pursue trade agreements of varying levels of flexibility. 
So how do changes in the trading environment influence the value potential 
members place on trade agreement flexibility?  This paper focuses on one particular 
type of change; namely, a shock to future trade costs.  We demonstrate that if these 
costs are expected to decline in the future (“trade liberalization”), the preferred degree 
of trade bloc flexibility varies with country characteristics.  On the other hand, if trade 
costs are expected to rise in the future (“trade protection”), trading nations opt for 
relatively rigid trade agreements regardless of their characteristics. 
The intuition for these results is as follows.  If trade liberalization is expected, 
the opportunity cost associated with membership of a rigid trade bloc can be 
significant; members are unable to exploit new trading opportunities that arise.  This 
is particularly true for countries that have most to gain from the profit-shifting 
benefits of trade policy.  If trade protection is expected, countries seek to “lock-in” 
trade partners to a free trade future via inflexible trade agreements.  We characterise 
these preferences over flexibility in terms of, on the one hand, a country’s desire for 
the option to alter trade policy in light of changes to the trading environment, versus 
its desire for insurance against trade policy changes by trade partners on the other. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II sets out the theoretical model, 
Section III discusses individual country preferences for trade agreement flexibility 
and Section IV analyses equilibrium coalition formation.  Section V concludes. 
 
II. THE MODEL 
 
Following Krishna (1998), Freund (2000) and Ornelas (2007), we specify a 3-country 
partial equilibrium model of world trade in which XN  firms are domiciled in Country 
X, YN  in Country Y and ZN  in Country Z.  Markets are segmented.
8  In each market 
firms compete on Cournot terms producing a homogeneous good at constant marginal 
cost 0c > .  Demand for this good in Country i is given by i i iP A Q= −  where iP  is its 
price, iQ  is the total quantity and ( )iA c>  is a demand parameter.  Country i levies a 
specific trade tax jit  on imports from Country j.   
Trade occurs over two periods.  Between periods one and two, a trade shock 
occurs.  In each period, countries play a three-stage game.  First, trade agreements are 
formed.  Second, given these coalitions, optimal trade taxes are chosen.  Third, firms 
select their profit maximizing output and markets clear.  In period 2, following the 
trade shock, this game is repeated subject to the coalitions formed in period 1.  We 
solve backwards for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
 
II.A. Stage Three: Firm Output Choice 
Since markets are segmented, we focus our attention on country X.  The analysis is 
analogous for countries Y and Z.  Demand for the homogeneous good in country X is 
given by DX X XQ A P= −  and total supply by S X Y ZX X X Y X Z XQ N q N q N q= + +  where jXq  is 
                                                   
8 Price discrimination is observed even in highly integrated markets.  See, for example, Goldberg and 
Verboven’s (2005) study of the European car industry.  In integrated markets, market segmentation 
may be unrelated to member country trade policies arising, for example, due to differences in consumer 
tastes or income (Malueg and Schwartz, 1994) or government regulation (Grossman and Lai, 2008). 
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the amount that a firm domiciled in Country j sells in Country X.  Since all firms 
regardless of origin have identical costs, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium in 
which all firms of common nationality sell the same output in a particular market. 
The profit a Country-j firm makes from selling in Country X can be written as ( ) ,j j jX X X XP c t qπ = − − , ,j X Y Z= .  The firm chooses jXq  to maximize this profit 
subject to the output choices of its Cournot competitors and independent of its own 
output choices in other markets.  The first order condition is 
 
(1)   ( ) 0j j jX X X Xj
X
P c t q
q
π∂ = − − − =∂ ,  , ,j X Y Z= . 
 
Equation system (1) comprises three best-response functions, one for each country, in 
three unknowns.  Solving this system yields Nash equilibrium outputs of the form: 
 
(2)   
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
1
1
1
1
Y Z
X Y X Z XX
X
X Y Z
Y Z
X X Z X Z XY
X
X Y Z
Y Z
X Y X X Y XZ
X
X Y Z
A c N t N t
q
N N N
A c N N t N t
q
N N N
A c N t N N t
q
N N N
− + += + + +
− − + + += + + +
− + − + += + + +
. 
 
In equation (2), the impact of Country X’s trade taxes on the quantities sold in X is 
weighted by the number of firms domiciled in each country.  That is, the trade tax 
impact depends on the extent to which there exist alternative sources of supply. 
In equilibrium the goods market clears such that D SX XQ Q= .  Substituting the 
output expressions from (2) into the demand function yields the following solution for 
the equilibrium price of the homogeneous good in country X: 
 
(3)   ( )
1
Y Z
X X Y Z Y X Z X
X
X Y Z
A c N N N N t N t
P
N N N
+ + + + += + + + . 
 
Equation (3) implies that the impact of local trade taxes on the domestic price is 
greater the larger the number of foreign firms.   
 
II.B. Stage Two: Optimal Trade Tax Choice 
Country X’s welfare is the sum of consumer surplus, trade tax revenue and total firm 
profit and can be written as ( ) ( )2
, ,2
Y Y Z Z X XX
X X Y X X Z X X i i i
i X Y Z
QW t N q t N q N P c t q
=
= + + + − −∑ .  
Policymakers choose optimal trade taxes to maximize welfare.  Note that from 
equations (2) and (3) a country’s trade taxes only influence domestic prices and 
output.  The implications of this are two-fold.  First, there is no terms-of-trade welfare 
benefit associated with trade taxes.  Second, the domestic policymaker cannot 
influence her firms’ foreign profits. 
 7 
 In choosing optimal trade tax rates, countries adhere to the WTO’s most 
favored nation (MFN) principle; equal tax rates are levied on all trade partners.  RTA 
members are exempted from this rule and can discriminate in favor of each other.   
 In the case in which all countries stand alone, referred to here as “unilateral 
tariff setting” (UTS), MFN implies that , ,,
Y Z X Z
X X X UTS Y Y Y UTSt t t t t t= = = =  and 
,
X Y
Z Z Z UTSt t t= = .  For the UTS case, Country X’s optimal MFN trade tax is: 
 
(4)   ( )( )( ),
1 2
2 2 2
X
X UTS
X X Y Z
A c N
t
N N N N
− += + + + + .                       
 
 In the case where Country Z stands alone while countries X and Y form a free 
trade area, FTA(X,Y), bilateral trade between countries X and Y is duty free, i.e. 
0Y XX Yt t= = .  Country X’s optimal trade tax on the excluded Country Z takes the form: 
 
(5)    ( )( )( ), 2
1 2
2 1 2
XZ
X FTAxy
X Y Z Y Z
A c N
t
N N N N N
− += + + + + . 
 
 In the case where Country Z stands alone while countries X and Y form a 
customs union, CU(X,Y), countries X and Y levy zero trade taxes on each other as well 
as a common external tariff (CET) on imports from Z, i.e. 0Y XX Yt t= =  and 
( ), ,
Z Z Z
X Y CET CU X Yt t t= = .  In choosing the optimal CET, countries X and Y maximize a 
weighted sum of their national welfare, ( )( , ) 1CU X Y X YW W Wγ γ= + − .  In this paper, the 
weights are set to 1/ 2γ =  exogenously.9  The optimal CET can be written as:  
 
(6)    ( )( )( ), 2
1 2 2
2 1
X YZ
CET CUxy
X Y Z
A c N N
t
N N N
− + += + + + .  
 
 In our framework, other coalition structures are also possible.  In particular, 
we consider the case of global free trade (GFT) in which all trade regardless of origin 
or destination is duty free.  Furthermore, we consider the possibility of overlapping 
FTAs.  To illustrate the trade tax equilibrium in this latter case, consider the situation 
in which FTA(X,Y) and FTA(X,Z) coexist.  In this case, 0Y XX Yt t= =  and 0Z XX Zt t= = .  
Hence only two trade tax rates require to be solved for, ZYt  and 
Y
Zt .  In this framework, 
these are identical to ,Y UTSt  and ,Z UTSt  respectively.  In fact, for all the coalition 
structures analyzed in this paper, the equilibrium trade tax rates are either analogous 
or identical to the rates defined in equations (4), (5) and (6). 
 
LEMMA 1. Optimal trade taxes are positive provided 0A c> >  and , , 1X Y ZN N N ≥ . 
PROOF.  By inspection of equations (4), (5) and (6). 
 
                                                   
9 In fact, the choice of weights can influence coalition formation (Melatos and Woodland, 2007).   
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Lemma 1 says that, provided that there is at least one firm domiciled in each country, 
import tariffs are always optimal; import subsidies never arise.  In the presence of 
import tariffs, prices and quantities are always positive (see equations (2) and (3)). 
 
II.C. Trade Shocks 
We have argued that countries’ coalition formation decisions are likely to change in 
response to changes in the trading environment.  To demonstrate how, we examine 
two cases of very simple, stylized (and exogenous) trade shocks.10   
The first case represents expected future “trade liberalization” in which an 
initially autarkic Country Z opens to world trade in period 2.11  In solving this case, 
the above model is augmented with the following additional restrictions in period 1: 
0X Y Z ZZ Z X Yq q q q= = = = .  The second case represents an episode of expected future 
“trade protection” in which Country Z, a trading nation in period 1, becomes autarkic 
in period 2.  In solving this case, the following additional restrictions are imposed in 
period 2: 0X Y Z ZZ Z X Yq q q q= = = = .  Note that in the “trade protection” case, although 
Country Z is isolated in period 2, we assume that it continues to trade freely with any 
country with which it concluded a trade agreement in period 1.  This captures the 
insurance motive for trade bloc formation.  
 
II.D. Stage One: Coalition Formation 
Having determined the welfare implications of each potential coalition structure, 
countries can select their preferred option from the menu of possible outcomes.  
Following Riezman (1985), the solution concept employed here is the core.  A 
coalition structure resides in the core if it is not blocked by any coalition.  A coalition, 
S, blocks a coalition structure, T, if for all countries i in S, ( ) ( )i iU S U T≥ , with strict 
inequality for at least one member of S. 
Trade blocs can form in each period.  Indeed, countries may also agree to form 
multiple RTAs simultaneously in any given period.  However, for simplicity we 
assume that once established, trade agreements cannot be reversed; the (reputation) 
costs of reneging on an existing trade agreement are prohibitive.  This implies that the 
feasible set of coalitions in period 2 is constrained by the coalitions formed in the 
period 1.  Effectively, therefore, countries choose a sequence of coalitions to 
maximize their two-period welfare.12  Tables I and II list the feasible two-period 
sequences of coalition structures that can occur in the “trade liberalization” and “trade 
protection” cases respectively.  
 
[Insert Tables I and II about here] 
 
While overlapping FTAs are allowed, CUs are not permitted to overlap with 
an FTA.13  If a CU overlaps with an existing FTA, or an FTA overlaps with an 
existing CU, the CET is necessarily zero and one union member will be obliged to 
                                                   
10 Endogenizing the trade shock is an important issue, but lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
11 This approach, although highly stylized, provides a simple way to demonstrate how trade blocs may 
overlap as a result of changes to the trading environment.  In fact, such extreme changes to the trading 
environment are not unknown in the real world – the incorporation of China and the former Eastern 
Bloc countries into the world trading system are cases in point.  In any case, the trade shock could be 
modeled more generally as a continuous trade costs variable. 
12 For simplicity we abstract from time discounting. 
13 In this model, if CUs overlap with each other global free trade (considered separately) results.  
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levy this duty free rate in the face of a positive tariff from its trade partner outside the 
union. By forbidding CU-FTA overlap the analysis is simplified by removing the 
need to consider compensatory transfers between trade bloc members.14  However, 
members of an existing RTA can agree to deepen their bloc or expand its 
membership; for example, an FTA in period 1 can mature into a CU or global free 
trade in period 2.   
Tables I and II clarify the concept of trade bloc flexibility which underpins 
this paper.  The UTS coalition structure in which all countries stand alone guarantees 
the greatest flexibility (i.e. the greatest number of feasible period 2 coalition 
structures).  Note that for case 1, when Country Z is autarkic in period 1, FTA(X,Y) 
and CU(X,Y) are welfare equivalent in period 1.  However, they do not imply the 
same two-period welfare because FTA(X,Y) provides access to a larger set of feasible 
period 2 coalition structures.  That is, FTA(X,Y) is more flexible than CU(X,Y). 
 
II.E. Some Important Relationships 
We now derive three results that underpin the propositions presented in later sections.  
Consistent with the simulation results reported later, we assume that all countries have 
identical demands; that is, ,iA A i= ∀ .   
 
LEMMA 2. In equilibrium, Country i’s welfare is inversely related to foreign tariffs. 
PROOF.  See the Appendix. 
 
Lemma 2 implies that foreign tariffs impact negatively on a country’s welfare 
regardless of the international distribution of firms.  The intuition is as follows.  
Foreign tariffs only influence a country’s welfare through their impact on the foreign 
profits of its domestically domiciled firms.  At the same time, tariffs shift profit from 
domestic to foreign firms.   
 Lemma 3 relates a country’s optimal tariff choice to the parameters of the 
model, in particular, the international distribution of firms.   
 
LEMMA 3.   
Provided that ,i jN N  and kN  are such that under FTA(i,j) 
( ) ( ) ( )2 1 2 1 0; , , , ,i i j j k kN N N N N N i j k X Y Z+ − + + − > = : 
(i). Country i’s optimal equilibrium tariffs are inversely related to the number of 
firms domiciled in Country i. 
(ii). The optimal equilibrium CET for CU(i,j) is inversely related to the number of 
firms domiciled in Country i and Country j. 
PROOF.  See the Appendix. 
 
Lemma 3 says that a country’s (or customs union’s) optimal tariffs are inversely 
related to the number of its domestic firms provided that this number of firms is 
“sufficiently large” relative to the number of firms domiciled overseas. 
The intuition behind Lemma 3 is as follows.  To begin, note that a country’s 
consumer surplus, tariff revenue and the domestic profitability of its local firms 
depend only on its own (not foreign) tariffs.  In choosing its optimal tariff, therefore, a 
                                                   
14 The role of compensation in trade bloc overlap is an important issue deserving of separate study.  
Note that the EU, a CU, has a number of FTAs with non-member countries, agreements to which all 
EU members are signatories. 
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country (or CU members jointly) must balance three effects of raising its tariffs.  
First, equations (2) and (3) show that domestic prices and domestic sales rise by more, 
the greater the number of foreign-domiciled firms.  Second, foreign firm sales fall by 
more the greater the number of local firms (equation (2)).  Third, an increase in 
domestic tariffs raises tariff revenue further the more firms are domiciled abroad.  
Overall, therefore, while higher domestic tariffs help shift profits to local firms (and 
tariff revenue to the local government), the reduction in consumer surplus may be 
even greater if there are too many local firms.  In short, countries with many local 
firms relative to their trading partners will tend to levy lower tariffs.15 
 Lemmas 2 and 3 together provide an insight into the driving force behind RTA 
formation and design in our modeling framework.  Lemma 2 suggests that countries 
seek to ‘avoid’ high tariffs levied by their trading partners.  In this model, countries 
‘avoid’ foreign tariffs by creating trade blocs.  Lemma 3 implies that there is a greater 
incentive to pursue duty free trade with nations characterized by a small number of 
domestic firms because such nations will tend to levy higher tariffs. 
 One implication of Lemmas 2 and 3 is that if both a country’s trading partners 
are characterized by few domestic firms, it will prefer free trade with both of them.  
The country may achieve this either by pursuing global free trade or by establishing 
overlapping FTAs with itself as the hub.  Lemma 4 shows that in our modeling 
framework, overlapping FTAs will always be preferred in this case. 
 
LEMMA 4. A prospective hub country prefers overlapping FTAs to GFT 
PROOF.  Without loss of generality, compare the coalition structure {FTA(X,Y), 
FTA(X,Z)} to GFT.  Lemma 4 implies that Country X prefers the former coalition 
structure to the latter.  This is because under overlap, Country X firms benefit in two 
ways from the tariffs countries Y and Z levy on each other.  First, as can be seen from 
equation (2), a tariff war between Y and Z translates into higher sales in those 
countries for Country X firms.  Second, as equation (3) demonstrates, a tariff war 
between Y and Z raises domestic prices in both countries.  Thus, compared to the case 
in which there is free trade between countries Y and Z, Country X firms export more 
units to Y and Z and, once there, sell them at higher prices.  At the same time, X’s 
exports have duty free access to Y and Z just as they would under global free trade.  
 
III. COUNTRY PREFERENCE FOR TRADE BLOC FLEXIBILTIY  
 
In this section we demonstrate that in a trading world such as that described in Section 
II, the desire for trade bloc flexibility varies with country characteristics and the 
nature of any trade shock.  This section is only concerned with an individual country’s 
preferences among different trade bloc designs.  Equilibrium coalition formation – 
that is, the contents of the core – is calculated in Section IV. 
Unfortunately, our model does not yield easily interpretable closed form 
solutions with regards to country preference rankings of coalition structures.  Since 
these preference orderings are our ultimate concern, we simulate the model.  In the 
simulations that follow, all countries have identical demands but the distribution of 
                                                   
15 In this model, it is important not to confuse the number of domestic firms with country size.  Here, 
countries with few firms levy higher tariffs; they act like the “large” countries of traditional analysis.  
Remember, however, that in this model, there are no terms-of-trade effects. 
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firms is unequal across countries.  In particular, 10iA i= ∀ , 1c =  and 5ZN = .  The 
number of firms in X and Y vary in the range [ ], 1, 40X YN N ∈ .16 
 For the trade liberalization case, Figure I shows how Country X’s trade bloc 
preferences vary with the international distribution of firms.  For each cell, the 
shading reveals Country X’s preferred two-period sequence of coalition structures.  
That is, the sequence that maximizes Country X’s total two-period (undiscounted) 
welfare.   
 
[Insert Figure I about here] 
 
The contents of each cell in Figure I indicate whether Country X’s preferred 
two-period coalition sequence is consistent with welfare maximization in periods 1 
and 2 separately.  Empty cells, indicate that it is.  Cells populated with a “&”, 
however, indicate that while, in a static world, X would prefer to establish FTA(X,Y) 
or CU(X,Y) in period 1, concern for its second period welfare combined with trade 
bloc irreversibility induces it to choose a less preferred coalition structure in the first 
period in order to maximize its total two-period welfare.  Cells labeled “$” 
meanwhile, indicate that X prefers a two-period coalition sequence which is 
inconsistent with welfare maximization in the second period.  
 In order to interpret Figure I, note first that the bolded border cell at 
( ) ( ), 5,5X YN N =  represents the symmetric equilibrium in which all three countries 
are identical.  At this point, Country X’s welfare (both the two-period total and in each 
period individually) is maximized if in period 1 it forms FTA(X,Y) and in period 2 it 
forms an overlapping FTA with Country Z. 
 Inspection of Figure I suggests the following proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 1. If trade agreements are irreversible and a trade liberalizing 
shock is expected in the future, then a country’s desire for trade bloc flexibility varies 
inversely with the number of domestic firms it has relative to its trading partners.  
 
The lemmas derived in Section II.E. underpin Proposition 1.  In the yellow-shaded 
region in Figure I ( XN  large relative to YN  and ZN ) Country X wants free trade with 
both Y and Z so as to avoid the high tariff rates that these countries would otherwise 
impose on its exports.  Since from Lemma 4 we know that a “hub” country prefers 
overlapping FTAs to GFT, then Country X prefers FTA(X,Y) & FTA(X,Z) in period 2.  
But trade bloc irreversibility implies that in period 1 X must either stand alone or form 
FTA(X,Y).  That X prefers FTA(X,Y) to standing alone in period 1 is indicative of a 
desire for trade bloc rigidity.17 
This ‘rigidity bias’ is even more stark in the case of the yellow-shaded cells 
populated by a “$”.  Here, X’s period 2 welfare is maximized by forming CU(X,Z).  
                                                   
16 Many different parameter values were analyzed yielding similar results.  In particular, we also 
investigate the case in which country demands differ.  However, this analysis is hampered by the fact 
that for large parts of the parameter space equilibrium quantities, prices or import tariffs are negative 
for at least one of the equilibrium coalition structures considered.  Nevertheless, where economically 
feasible equilibria are obtained for all coalition structures, the spirit of our results is maintained.   
17 Similarly, in the purple shaded region, Countries X and Y have a small number of domestic firms 
relative to Z.  Country X, therefore, seeks a CU with Country Y in period 2 in order to avoid the latter’s 
relatively high tariff rates.  Note that unlike Country Z, Y is available to join an RTA in period 1. 
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Nevertheless, it chooses to form the overlapping agreements FTA(X,Y) and FTA(X,Z) 
instead.  Note from Table I that for CU(X,Z) to be feasible in period 2, Country X 
would have to stand alone in period 1.  That X does not choose to follow this route 
reflects the fact that the higher period 2 payoff from CU(X,Z) does not compensate for 
the lower period 1 welfare associated with standing alone.  The option value of trade 
bloc flexibility in these cases is clearly insufficient to tempt Country X.   
In the red-shaded region in Figure I ( YN  and XN  large relative to ZN ) 
Country X wants free trade with Z in period 2 in order to avoid Z’s high import tariff 
rates.  In this region, Country X prefers CU(X,Z) to FTA(X,Z) because the CU 
internalizes the tariff externality by allowing X and Z to choose their external tariffs 
jointly.18  Remember, however, that CU(X,Z) is only feasible in period 2 if X stands 
alone in period 1.  Hence, X has a distinct preference for trade bloc flexibility. 
This ‘flexibility bias’ is even more pronounced in the case of the red-shaded 
cells populated with a “&”.  While in this region X’s period 1 welfare is maximized 
by forming RTA(X,Y), this choice is inconsistent with the formation of CU(X,Z) in 
period 2.19  Indeed, it turns out that in this region, the welfare Country X gains from 
CU(X,Z) in period 2 more than compensates it for the welfare it sacrifices by standing 
alone in period 1.  Country X clearly appreciates the option value of trade bloc 
flexibility (i.e. standing alone) in these cases. 
When XN  becomes smaller relative to YN  and ZN  (the blue-shaded region), 
Country X prefers to stand alone in both periods as the high tariffs it levies on imports 
from Y and Z shift sufficient profits from those countries to outweigh profits lost by 
Country X firms due to foreign tariffs.  However, if XN  becomes too small (the 
green-shaded region), the profit shifting benefits to Country X from high local tariffs 
are diluted as suggested by Lemma 3.  In this case, concern for the profit shifting 
effect of foreign tariffs once again dominates and Country X prefers overlapping 
FTAs with Y and Z. 
Finally, it is worth noting a heartening feature of Figure I: overlapping FTAs 
are commonly, though not always, preferred.  In fact, Figure I demonstrates that a 
country, at a given point of time, may prefer to stand alone (the red-shaded region), be 
a member of a single CU (the purple and red-shaded regions), be a member of a single 
FTA (the yellow and blue-shaded region) or be a member of multiple FTAs 
simultaneously (the green and yellow shaded regions).  Figure I, therefore, reflects the 
observed diversity of trade agreement designs.   
Turning now to the “trade protection” case, Figure II suggests the following 
proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 2. If trade agreements are irreversible and a trade protection shock 
is expected in the future, then all countries will prefer greater trade bloc rigidity.   
 
[Insert Figure II about here] 
 
Proposition 2 suggests that in a world in which future trade protection is expected 
there is no desire for trade bloc flexibility. 
                                                   
18 The externality arises because by raising its import tariffs, a country raises its domestic price (see 
equation (3)) thereby conferring a benefit on foreign firms selling into this market. 
19 Remember that, by design, CUs and FTAs are not permitted to overlap. 
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In the red-shaded region in Figure II, Country X prefers CU(X,Z) in period 1 
so as to avoid Z’s high tariff rates.  Due to irreversibility and the nature of the trade 
shock, this coalition structure will endure in period 2.  In period 2, however, when Z 
only trades with its period one trade bloc partners or not at all, X would prefer to be 
the hub country in the overlapping agreements FTA(X,Y) and FTA(X,Z).  In order to 
achieve this, X could choose to form the more flexible bloc FTA(X,Z) in period 1 
instead of CU(X,Z).  The fact that it does not do this implies that in these cases the 
option value associated with trade bloc flexibility is insufficient to compensate for the 
welfare forgone in period 1 by forming FTA(X,Z).  Effectively, Country X “locks-in” 
the welfare gains arising from first period coalition formation, insuring itself against 
the anticipated future constraints on trade (and bloc formation). 
 In the green-shaded region X prefers to be the hub linking two overlapping 
trade blocs, FTA(X,Y) and FTA(X,Z), in both periods 1 and 2.20  This preference 
endures even when CU(X,Z), FTA(Y,Z) or CU(X,Y) would yield a higher payoff in 
period 1 (respectively, the &-labeled, #-labeled and $-labeled cells).  Of course, none 
of these alternative first period coalition structures are consistent with X’s desire to be 
the hub of overlapping FTAs in period 2.  The fact that X prefers to establish these 
overlapping agreements from the first period demonstrates its desire to “lock-in” the 
2nd-period welfare benefits of overlap from period 1 even at the expense of some 
period 1 welfare.  Country X effectively insures itself against future constraints to 
bloc formation resulting from trade bloc irreversibility and increased protection. 
 
IV. EQUILIBRIUM TRADE BLOC FORMATION 
 
While the preceding analysis has shed light on individual country attitudes to trade 
bloc flexibility, it provides little guidance on what type of coalition structure is 
observed in equilibrium.  In particular, are the coalition structures predicted by our 
model consistent with the stylized facts on trade bloc formation identified at the 
outset?  To answer questions such as this, we analyze the contents of the core. 
 The preceding section demonstrated that, consistent with observed behavior, 
countries commonly prefer FTAs (and overlapping FTAs) to other types of blocs.  
But do these preferences survive in the core?  Figure III suggests that often they do.   
 
[Insert Figure III about here] 
 
For the “trade liberalization” case Figure III identifies those cells in which coalition 
structures in the core are characterized either by FTAs or a CU.21  In the green-shaded 
regions FTAs are observed.  In the blue-shaded regions CUs are observed.  In the red-
shaded cells coalition structures characterized by overlapping FTAs or a CU coexist 
in the core.  The labels in each region refer to the membership of equilibrium RTAs. 
Figure III suggests the following two propositions. 
 
PROPOSITION 3.  When the number of domestic firms in any two countries is 
“sufficiently similar” (and “sufficiently different” to the third country) then a CU 
involving the two similar countries is observed in the core.   
 
                                                   
20 This is for the same reasons that X preferred to form overlapping FTAs in the yellow and green-
shaded regions in Figure I. 
21 In some cases, the RTA coalition structures are not the unique elements of the core. 
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PROPOSITION 4.  If the distribution of firms among all countries is “sufficiently 
similar”, the core consists of either: (i) a FTA between the two countries with the 
smallest number of domestically domiciled firms, or (ii) overlapping FTAs in which 
the country with a relatively small number of domestic firms is the “hub” and the 
countries with the relatively large number of domestic firms are the “spokes”. 
 
Proposition 3 confirms a result obtained by Melatos and Woodland (2007) in a 
perfectly competitive general equilibrium model of world trade.  The intuition is as 
follows.  In the blue shaded regions in Figure III, two countries have a relatively large 
number of domestic firms.  From Lemmas 2 and 3 we know that each of these 
countries wishes to engage in free trade with the third (dissimilar) country whose 
relatively small number of domestic firms induces it to levy high import tariffs.  From 
the point of view of the core, however, symmetry ensures that the preferred coalition 
of each similar country – a CU with the dissimilar nation – block each other.  Note 
that similar countries that are sufficiently different to the third country prefer a CU to 
a FTA for three reasons.  First, the former internalizes the externality arising from the 
impact of tariffs on domestic prices.  Second, this externality benefit is larger the 
more different is the excluded country.  Third, if the CU members are sufficiently 
similar, the CET chosen does not diverge significantly from their individually optimal 
external tariff rates. 
Proposition 4 is an important result that links our paper to the literature on hub 
and spoke trade agreements and.  Proposition 4, to the best of our knowledge, 
represents the first time that a theoretical result has been derived predicting the 
characteristics of hub and spoke countries in overlapping trade agreements.  The 
intuition for Proposition 4 is as follows.  FTAs (and, in particular, overlapping FTAs) 
survive in the core when all countries are similar because no two countries have 
sufficient incentive to form a CU (as per Proposition 3).  Moreover, from Lemma 4 a 
“hub” country always prefers overlapping FTAs to GFT.   
Note that Propositions 3 and 4 also hold in the case of an anticipated increase 
in trade protection in the future.  This can be seen in Figure IV.   
 
[Insert Figure IV about here] 
 
Countries with a similar number of domestic firms tend to form CUs among 
themselves – witness the blue shaded regions in Figure IV.  Moreover, in overlapping 
FTAs, the country with fewer domestic firms is the “hub”.  There is, however, an 
important difference between the trade liberalization and trade protection cases.  In 
the latter case, Countries X and Y never form a CU.  As a result, overlapping FTAs are 
much more commonly observed in the trade protection case.  This occurs because in 
this case Country Z withdraws from the trading system in period 2.  Thus, X and Y 
wish to lock Z into a two-period trading relationship by concluding a FTA with it in 
period 1.  Since CUs and FTAs are not permitted to overlap, this rules out CU(X,Y). 
 Finally, two other issues merit some comment.  The first concerns the 
observed lack of renegotiation of existing trade blocs even in the face of changes to 
the trade environment (our second stylized fact).  Figure III shows that in this model, 
such ‘coalitional inertia’ is often reflected in the core; all countries often stand alone 
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in both periods (the black-shaded region) or, in the case of CU(X,Y), form CUs in 
period 1 which endure into period 2.22  
The second issue worthy of comment relates to the occurrence of global free 
trade in equilibrium.  In the trade liberalization case (Figure III), GFT only survives in 
the core in a handful of cells clustered around the symmetric case , , 5X Y ZN N N = .  On 
the other hand, in the trade protection case (Figure IV), GFT is much more commonly 
observed, invariably sharing the core with a coalition structure characterized by 
overlapping FTAs.  In short, GFT is much more likely to be observed if trade 
protection is expected to increase in the future.  This is because countries look to 
circumvent the expected trade protection in period 2 by locking-in free trade 
agreements from the first period.  This is another manifestation of the insurance 
motive for rigidity in trade bloc design. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The main aim of this paper has been to model trade bloc formation and design over 
time when the trading environment is changing.  In the process, we have sought to 
highlight the role trade agreement flexibility plays in coalition formation.  Moreover, 
we set ourselves the goal of developing a model to endogenously explain three 
stylized facts characterizing regionalism: (i) overlapping RTAs, (ii) the popularity of 
FTAs relative to CUs and (iii) renegotiation or disbandment of existing RTAs is rare. 
Implementing a partial equilibrium trade model that incorporates endogenous 
coalition formation, we find that when trade liberalization is expected in the future, a 
country’s desire for trade bloc flexibility varies inversely with the number of domestic 
firms it has.  On the other hand, when increased trade protection is expected in the 
future, there is no desire for trade bloc flexibility by any nation.   
Our model also makes predictions regarding which coalition structures are 
likely to arise in equilibrium.  Customs unions involving similar countries can be 
supported in equilibrium if the excluded country is sufficiently different.  When 
individual free trade areas are observed in the core, the member countries are those 
with the fewest domestic firms.  In the case where overlapping FTAs are observed the 
country with the smaller number of domestic firms is the “hub” while the countries 
with the relatively large number of domestic firms are the “spokes”.  A reticence to 
renegotiate existing trade agreements in the face of a trade shock is also observed.   
All of these results are consistent with the stylized facts we set ourselves the 
task of explaining.  Nevertheless, much remains to be done.  In particular, further 
work should investigate the role of compensatory income transfers in the formation of 
overlapping RTAs.  The relationship between trade shocks and trade bloc formation 
should be endogenized.  Finally, modeling the trade shock more generally as a 
continuous trade cost variable for example should make it possible to relate the value 
a country places on trade bloc flexibility to the observed degree of volatility in the 
trading environment.  
 
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY  
THE RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA 
                                                   
22 In Figure IV, coalitional inertia is ubiquitous although this is mainly due to the nature of the trade 
protection shock that was exogenously imposed. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
We prove Lemma 2 for Country X only; the proof is analogous for countries Y and Z.  
Consider the definition of Country X welfare in the text.  Note that foreign tariffs only 
impact Country X welfare through the (foreign) profits Country X firms make in Y and 
Z, XYπ  and XZπ  respectively.  
We wish to demonstrate that, in equilibrium, Country X welfare is inversely related to 
tariffs levied by a foreign Country j.  That is, 0, ,
X
jX
MFN MFN
j j
ddW j Y Z
dt dt
π= < = .   
In the case in which the foreign country stands alone, differentiating Country X 
welfare with respect to j’s MFN tariffs yields 
( ) 1Xj jMFN XX j j jMFN MFN MFN
j j j
dq dPdW P c t q
dt dt dt
⎛ ⎞= − − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
.  Using equations (2), (3) and (4) from 
the text and manipulating the algebra yields: 
( ) ( )( )
3 4 2
0, , , 0
2 2 2
Y X ZX
X Y ZMFN
j Y Y X Z
N N NdW A c N N N
dt N N N N
⎡ ⎤+ + += − > ∀ ≥⎢ ⎥+ + + +⎣ ⎦
.  By symmetry, 
this holds for each country j and, hence, Lemma 2 is confirmed.  For the case in 
which the foreign country is a member of a discriminatory trade bloc, one of the 
foreign tariffs is zero and a similar expression is obtained. 
 
Proof of Lemma 3 
We prove Lemma 3 for Country X only; the proof is analogous for countries Y and Z.   
For each type of coalition structure CS, we wish to show under what conditions 
, 0X CS
X
t
N
∂ <∂ .  Differentiating equations (4), (5) in the text with respect to XN  and (6) 
with respect to both XN  and YN  yields, respectively: 
( )
( )
,
2
2( ) 2 1
2 2 2
X X Y ZX UTS
X X X Y Z
A c N N N Nt
N N N N N
− + − −⎡ ⎤∂ ⎣ ⎦= −∂ + + + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
, ,
22
2( ) 2 1 2 1
2 1 2
X FTA X Y X X Y Y Z Z
X
X Y Z Y Z
t A c N N N N N N
N N N N N N
∂ − + − + + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦= −∂ ⎡ ⎤+ + + +⎣ ⎦
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
, , , ,
4 2 2
2( ) 2 1
4 1 4 1
X CU X Y X CU X Y X Y X Y Z
X Y X Y Z X Y Z
t t A c N N N N N
N N N N N N N N
∂ ∂ − + + + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦= = −∂ ∂ + + + + + +  
As pointed out in the text, all other coalition structures we consider either yield 
identical or symmetric outcomes to UTS, FTA(X,Y) and CU(X,Y).  It is 
straightforward to show that a sufficient condition for , 0,X CS
X
t
CS
N
∂ < ∀∂  is given by 
( ) ( )2 1 2 1 0X X Y Y Z ZN N N N N N+ − + + − > .   
 
REFERENCES 
 17 
 
Abrego, Lisandro, Raymond G. Riezman, and John Whalley, “How Often are  
Propositions on the Effects of Regional Trade Agreements Theoretical  
Curiosa?” Journal of International Economics, 68 (2006), 59–78.  
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger, “A Theory of Managed Trade,” American  
Economic Review, 80 (1990), 779-795.  
───, “Enforcement, Private Political Pressure and the GATT/WTO Escape Clause,”  
Journal of Legal Studies, 34 (2005), 471-513. 
Crawford, Jo-Ann., and Roberto V. Fiorentino, “The Changing Landscape of  
Regional Trade Agreements,” Discussion Paper No. 8, World Trade  
Organization, 2005. 
Ethier, William J., “Unilateralism in a Multilateral World,” Economic Journal, 112  
(2002), 266-292. 
Freund, Caroline L., “Multilateralism and the Endogenous Formation of Preferential  
Trade Agreements,” Journal of International Economics, 52 (2000), 359-376. 
Freund, Caroline L., and Çaglar Özden, “Trade Policy and Loss Aversion,” American  
Economic Review, 98 (2008), 1675-1691. 
Goldberg, Pinelopi K., and Frank Verboven, “Market Integration and Convergence to  
the Law of One Price: Evidence from the European Car Market,” Journal of  
International Economics, 65 (2005), 49-73. 
Grossman, Gene M., and Edwin L-C. Lai, “Parallel Imports and Price Controls,”  
RAND Journal of Economics, 39 (2008), 378-402. 
Guriev, Sergei M., and Mikhail M. Klimenko, “Duration and Term Structure of Trade  
Agreements,” Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337231, 2010. 
Horn, Henrik, Giovanni Maggi, and Robert W. Staiger, “Trade Agreements as  
Endogenously Incomplete Contracts,” forthcoming in American Economic  
Review. 
Krishna, Pravin, “Regionalism and Multilateralism: A Political Economy Approach,”  
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113 (1998), 227-252. 
Krueger, Anne O., “Free trade agreements versus customs unions,” Journal of  
Development Economics, 54 (1997), 169–187. 
Maggi, Giovanni, “The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade  
Cooperation,” American Economic Review, 89 (1999), 190–214. 
Malueg, David A., and Marius Schwartz, “Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion, and  
International Price Discrimination,” Journal of International Economics, 37  
(1994), 167-195. 
Martin, Alberto, and Wouter Vergote, “On the Role of Retaliation in Trade  
Agreements,” Journal of International Economics, 76 (2008), 61-77. 
Melatos, Mark, and Alan D. Woodland, “Endogenous Trade Bloc Formation in an  
Asymmetric World,” European Economic Review, 51 (2007), 901-924. 
Ornelas, Emanuel, “Exchanging Market Access at the Outsiders’ Expense: The Case  
of Customs Unions,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 40 (2007), 207-224. 
Perroni, Carlo, and John Whalley, “The New Regionalism: Trade Liberalization or  
Insurance?” Canadian Journal of Economics, 3 (2000), 1–24. 
Riezman, Raymond G., “Customs unions and the core,” Journal of International  
Economics, 19 (1985), 355–365. 
Schwartz, Warren F., and Alan O. Sykes, “The Economic Structure of Renegotiation  
and Dispute Resolution in the WTO/GATT System,” Journal of Legal Studies,  
31 (2002), 170-204. 
Wonnacott, Ronald J., “Free-Trade Agreements: For Better or Worse?” American  
 18 
Economic Review, 86 (1996), 62-66. 
World Trade Organisation, World Trade Report 2009 (Geneva: WTO Publications,  
2009). 
 19 
Table I 
Feasible Two-Period Coalition Sequences: “Trade Liberalization” Case 
 
Period-by-period coalition options  
Period 1 
(2 countries) 
Period 2 
(3 countries) 
2-period Coalition  
Sequence 
UTS UTS {UTS, UTS} 
 FTA(X,Y) {UTS, FTA(X,Y)} 
 FTA(X,Z) {UTS, FTA(X,Z)} 
 FTA(Y,Z) {UTS, FTA(Y,Z)} 
 CU(X,Y) {UTS, CU(X,Y)} 
 CU(X,Z) {UTS, CU(X,Z)} 
 CU(Y,Z) {UTS, CU(Y,Z)} 
 GFT {UTS, GFT} 
 FTA(X,Y) & FTA(X,Z) {UTS, FTA(X,Y) & FTA(X,Z)} 
 FTA(X,Y) & FTA(Y,Z) {UTS, FTA(X,Y) & FTA(Y,Z)} 
 FTA(X,Z) & FTA(Y,Z) {UTS, FTA(X,Z) & FTA(Y,Z)} 
FTA(X,Y) FTA(X,Y) {FTA(X,Y), FTA(X,Y)} 
 CU(X,Y) {FTA(X,Y), CU(X,Y)} 
 FTA(X,Z) {FTA(X,Y), FTA(X,Z)} 
 FTA(Y,Z) {FTA(X,Y), FTA(Y,Z)} 
 GFT {FTA{X,Y), GFT} 
CU(X,Y) CU(X,Y) {CU(X,Y), CU(X,Y)} 
 GFT {CU(X,Y), GFT} 
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Table II 
Feasible Two-Period Coalition Sequences: “Trade Protection” Case 
 
Period-by-period coalition options  
Period 1  
(3 countries) 
Period 2  
(2 countries) 
2-period Coalition 
Sequence 
UTS UTS {UTS, UTS} 
 FTA(X,Y) {UTS, FTA(X,Y)} 
 CU(X,Y) {UTS, CU(X,Y)} 
FTA(X,Y) FTA(X,Y) {FTA(X,Y), FTA(X,Y)} 
 CU(X,Y) {FTA(X,Y), CU(X,Y)} 
FTA(X,Z) FTA(X,Z) {FTA(X,Z), FTA(X,Z)} 
 FTA(X,Z) & FTA(X,Y) {FTA(X,Z), FTA(X,Z) & FTA(X,Y)} 
FTA(Y,Z) FTA(Y,Z) {FTA(Y,Z), FTA(Y,Z)} 
 FTA(Y,Z) & FTA(X,Y) {FTA(Y,Z), FTA(Y,Z) & FTA(X,Y)} 
FTA(X,Y) & FTA(X,Z) FTA(X,Y) & FTA(X,Z) {FTA(X,Y) & FTA(X,Z), FTA(X,Y) & FTA(X,Z)} 
FTA(X,Y) & FTA(Y,Z) FTA(X,Y) & FTA(Y,Z) {FTA(X,Y) & FTA(Y,Z), FTA(X,Y) & FTA(Y,Z)} 
FTA(X,Z) & FTA(Y,Z) FTA(X,Z) & FTA(Y,Z) {FTA(X,Z) & FTA(Y,Z), FTA(X,Z) & FTA(Y,Z)} 
 GFT {FTA(X,Z) & FTA(Y,Z), GFT} 
GFT GFT {GFT, GFT} 
CU(X,Y) CU(X,Y) {CU(X,Y), CU(X,Y)} 
CU(X,Z) CU(X,Z) {CU(X,Z), CU(X,Z)} 
CU(Y,Z) CU(Y,Z) {CU(Y,Z), CU(Y,Z)} 
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Figure I 
Country X’s Preferred Coalition Structures – Trade Liberalization Case ( 5ZN = ) 
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Figure II 
Country X’s Preferred Coalition Structures – Trade Protection Case ( 5ZN = ) 
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Figure III 
Core Composition – FTAs and CUs in the Trade Liberalization Case ( 5ZN = ) 
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 Figure IV 
Core Composition – CUs, FTAs and Overlapping FTAs in the Trade Protection Case ( 5ZN = ) 
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